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Government Bond Markets 
Problem: Bond  
Market Panics
Superior Option: 
Fiscal Interest Rate 
Equalization (FIRE)
Essential Issues
The aggravating turbulences in the market for euro government bonds have so far precluded any 
recovery from the debt crisis. The key problem is that structural reforms and consolidation meas-
ures have long impact lags and are not able to stop an acute self-fulfilling crisis of confidence. 
In the discussion on possible solutions for this dilemma, Eurobonds and their numerous vari-
ants are prominent. 
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However, a superior strategy exists which is a much milder remedy without the severe side-effects 
of mutual guarantees: This superior strategy is fiscal interest rate equalization (FIRE). With FIRE, 
countries that benefit from very low interest rates as a consequence of market panics would in-
vest some of their savings to subsidize the borrowing of crisis countries within a conditional fiscal 
scheme. Conditional on reform and consolidation measures, the scheme involves a partial equali-
zation of the fiscal burden from differing government bond yields in the market. 
This approach beats other options for a stabilization of government bonds markets since:
 ͮ  FIRE does not involve any guarantees on the side of the giving countries. Costs would materi-
alize instantaneously and not imply any burden shifting to later generations of voters.
 ͮ  FIRE has a natural and politically well defendable financing source: the gains from market 
panics on the side of the creditworthy countries. 
 ͮ  FIRE leaves interest rate differentiation existent. While Euro-bonds with joint and several  
liability would fully level interest rates, this would not be the case with FIRE. 
 ͮ  FIRE is reversible whereas Eurobonds hardly are. The intensity of FIRE can gradually be  
reduced. Thus a continuous and cautious phasing-out of FIRE is realistic after structural  
reforms are starting to pay off. 
 ͮ  FIRE is financially feasible: The debt weighted interest rates of the euro area have not in-
creased over the crisis so that losses and gains are symmetrical.  A simulation indicates that 
a FIRE scheme protecting Spain and Italy against 10 year-yields in excess of 5 percent for one 
year’s new bond issues would be associated with annual costs of about 5.7 billion euros.
FIRE – Principles
FIRE is based on the insight that market panics in Euro government bond markets create winners 
and losers. Issuers with a (relatively) high creditworthiness benefit from historically low refinanc-
ing conditions whereas issuers with deteriorating market standings can be confronted with an 
excess risk spread as a consequence of a deteriorating panic. The figure below on debt weighted 
average bond yields shows that gains and losses are symmetric: While the spread has increased 
in a dramatic way, the average government bond yield for the euro area has been stable over the 
years of the crisis. 
A straightforward remedy is that winners invest some of their interest rate savings into a fund 
which subsidizes the refinancing rate of crisis countries. To limit the size of the financing volume 
and to keep market discipline active 
no full compensation for interest rate 
differentials should be targeted at. 
Implicitly, interest rate equalization 
has already been practiced by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) through 
its government bond purchasing pro-
gram. By targeted purchases of bonds 
from the crisis countries at the sec-
ondary market, the ECB has influ-
enced risk spreads and temporarily 
contributed to slow down self-fulfill-
ing panic developments. However, 
fiscal interest rate equalization as 
proposed here is preferable to the 
ECB’s monetary interest rate equali-
zation. The monetary interventions 
at government bond markets are in 
conflict with a stability-oriented mon-
etary framework. They imply govern-
ment financing through the money 
printing press. Furthermore, this con-
flict impairs the long-run credibility of 
equalization. In contrast to the mon-
etary approach, FIRE is more explicit 
and credible. It does not stand in contrast to long-run monetary objectives and has a natural fi-
nancing source: the gains of countries that are the safe havens in a situation of market panics
FIRE – Institutional Details
For FIRE’s institutional implementation, a solution is desirable which is as transparent as possi-
ble. For that purpose, euro area countries should establish a mutual FIRE fund based on a FIRE 
treaty. The treaty’s voting rules must allow for a veto of any financing country. In order to safe-
guard FIRE’s credible availability, provisions should clarify that a veto of single countries would 
not prevent other countries from participating in the FIRE scheme.  
On conditionality, similar general provisions as they are formulated in EFSF/ESM agreements are 
sufficient. Specific interest rate equalization programs agreed upon under the FIRE treaty should 
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Secondary market yields of government bonds with maturities of close to ten years. Source: ECB
Euro-16/Euro-13: Debt-weighted yield of euro countries (Euro-16: without Estonia. Euro-13: without Estonia, Greece, Portugal and Ireland), own calculations. 
Source of debt data: European Commission, General Government Data, Spring 2012.  
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include the definition of the agreed issuance volume of program countries, the amount available 
for interest rate equalization per program country and a financing key. In line with the logic of 
the approach, a financing country’s burden would increase with its own volume of issuance and 
decrease with its own re-financing conditions since both components define a country’s crisis 
related gains.
There is the difficulty that the precise market spread is not predictable for the duration of the pro-
gram. One pragmatic solution would be to decide on the specific sums involved for a limited pe-
riod in advance (e.g. six months or one year) based on the currently observable market spreads. 
After one period this can then be adjusted to the new market conditions. 
As long as a crisis country is protected by this support scheme it would not experience a dete-
rioration of its fiscal position caused by an interest rate above FIRE’s upper ceiling. Thus, this 
approach is tailor-made to preclude the panic-driven deterioration of a fiscal position. In this 
respect, FIRE also offers an improved environment for measuring a country’s inherent fiscal pro-
gress. With each year a country benefits from FIRE, its fiscal performance is not distorted by ab-
normal refinancing conditions.
A final institutional question concerns FIRE’s interplay with the existing crisis instruments. For 
countries which are already shielded from the burden of high bond market yields through the ex-
isting credit facilities (Greece, Ireland, Portugal) FIRE would not apply. A first obvious activation 
should target at the protection of Spain and Italy. FIRE would make an extension of credit facilities 
to these countries redundant. This aspect points to another crucial advantage of FIRE. It could be 
a substitute for a further massive extension of the loan facilities of EFSF/ESM which would be-
come unavoidable once Italy seeks protection. 
FIRE can also be helpful in a later stage of the crisis. A critical phase will come when countries 
with EFSF/ESM support are close to a return to the bond market. A supporting FIRE program could 
then serve as a bridge into the market and could speed up the return to the market.
FIRE – Quantification
By construction, FIRE is cheaper than Eurobonds for creditworthy countries. Risk spreads are only 
partly compensated. Furthermore, low risk countries do not act as a guarantor. Thus, no provi-
sions for losses have to be taken which would be part of the instantaneous full economic costs of 
Eurobonds. Therefore, if Eurobonds are affordable there cannot be an insurmountable objective 
financing problem for FIRE since the latter involves substantially less transfers.
A simulation based on the market conditions in May 2012 indicates that the financial amounts 
are feasible. The assumption is that a FIRE fund is established which compensates Spain and 
Italy for market rates above 5 percent. Furthermore, it is assumed that high creditworthiness 
countries are ready to accept a gross interest rate (market rate plus equalization transfer) of 2.5 
percent for 10 year maturities. 
The table (see page 4) summarizes the costs of a FIRE program which would shield Spain and 
Italy for one year against long-run interest rates above 5 percent. Given the market conditions of 
May 2012 and the total issuance needs of both countries the annual interest rate subsidy for the 
2012 emissions would amount to approximately 5.7 billion euros. 
Only those countries with a market yield below 2.5 percent would contribute to the program’s 
financing. Given the May 2012 market conditions, these countries are: Germany, Finland, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands and Austria. The financing contribution of Austria and Luxembourg are 
marginal. Germany would finance 90 percent, the Netherlands 8 percent and Finland 2 percent 
of the scheme. This result reflects the fact that these three countries benefit most from the safe 
haven-effect.
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Simulation of FIRE for 2012 (Interest Cap of five Percent for Italy and Spain)
Receiving countries
Annual amount  
received in bn. EUR
Financing  
countries
Annual amount  
financed in bn. EUR
Italy 3.359 Germany 5.151
Spain 2.395 Finland 0.134
Luxembourg 0.013
Netherlands 0.451
Austria 0.005
Sum 5.754 5.754
The amount of 5.7 billion euros for the cost of the FIRE scheme refers to the annual interest rate 
subsidy for the total emissions of Italy and Spain in 2012. This subsidy would have to be paid 
annually over the whole maturity of 2012 emissions. Thus the initial annual fiscal burden for a 
country like Germany would amount to approximately 5 billion euros. This annual burden would 
increase with each year of prolongation of the scheme. This quantification demonstrates that the 
amounts involved for a protection even of Spain and Italy together are significant but feasible.
Europe has realized numerous important steps such as new fiscal rules or liquidity instruments 
during its fight against the European debt crisis. However, self-fulfilling panics in the euro govern-
ment bond markets can make these reasonable attempts futile. The current debate centered on 
Eurobonds variants as an allegedly reliable cure is flawed and does not pay sufficient attention 
to the dangerous economic and political side effects of that remedy. A much milder treatment 
is available and has, so far, been neglected. This is a temporal and conditional subsidy on gov-
ernment bond emissions of crisis countries along the lines of the FIRE scheme. European lead-
ers would be well advised to prepare new instruments along this line to have alternative tools in 
place for the fight against an escalating market situation.
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